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Executive Summary
Sugar trade has been at the heart of many inter­
national trade agreements. Sugar is one of the 
largest agricultural industries in the United States 
and thus is a sensitive commodity. Groups around 
the world have a vested interest in how the United 
States handles sugar production and trade. The 
latest change to the U.S. sugar program was the 
passage of the Central American Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA].
The United States imports raw cane sugar using a 
tariff-rate quota (TRQ] system. This trade regime 
sets in place specific tariffs within a set volume of 
sugar. If an exporting country exceeds the given 
quota within the allotted TRQ, the country faces a 
second-tier [and much higher] tariff. Owing to past 
trade agreements, such as the North American 
Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA], the Generalized 
System of Preferences, and the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative, many countries already have duty-free 
access, within a set volume, to the U.S. sugar 
market.
The pre-CAFTA TRQ system was criticized for 
creating artificial trade barriers and excluding low- 
cost producers from exporting raw cane sugar to 
the United States. The sugar-exporting countries 
that participate in the TRQ regime are different 
from those who participate in the tariff- and quota- 
free U.S. sugar import programs. These differences 
may serve to illustrate some of the trade imbal­
ances within the U.S. TRQ system.
On August 2, 2005, U.S. President George Bush 
signed DR-CAFTA,1 comprising Costa Rica, the 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, and the United States. This 
agreement will affect both sugar exports from 
these Central American countries and the U.S. 
sugar program.
It is believed that CAFTA will help Central 
American countries gain access to the U.S. sugar 
market. CAFTA may also affect the price of raw 
cane sugar in the United States, marketing allot­
1 After the Dominican Republic joined CAFTA in 2005, 
the agreement has often been known as "DR-CAFTA," 
but in this case study, it will be referred to as simply 
"CAFTA."
ments to U.S. sugar processors, and U.S. sugar 
industry jobs. Many U.S. sugar farmers and proces­
sors oppose CAFTA, fearing that the removal of 
trade barriers set in place under the TRQ regime 
will lead to a loss of U.S. sugar-producing jobs and 
an influx of low-cost sugar from abroad. Another 
question is whether or not imports from these 
Central American countries will affect other sugar- 
producing developing countries that have preferen­
tial access to the U.S. market from other trade 
agreements.
Like most trade agreements, however, CAFTA con­
tains a safeguard clause:
The Agreement also includes a mechanism 
that allows the United States, at its option, 
to provide some form of alternative com­
pensation to CAFTA country exporters in 
place of sugar imports. That allows the 
United States to restrict imports eligible to 
enter under the CAFTA if the U.S. sugar 
program is threatened, and instead provide 
equivalent benefits to the CAFTA coun­
tries to make up for the lost access [USTR 
2005],
Your assignment is to develop a set of polices 
under CAFTA that will satisfy all stakeholders. Dis­
cuss the policy issues with regard to alternative 
import mechanisms under CAFTA and which 
stakeholders might support or resist these policies. 
Justify your recommendations, and assess the con­
sequences for each stakeholder group.
Background
The Tariff-Rate Quota System for Raw Cane 
Sugar
Sugar can enter the United States through a variety 
of paths and policies, although the majority of U.S. 
sugar is imported through the use of tariff-rate 
quotas. TRQs were established in 1994 in the 
Agreement on Agriculture through the Uruguay 
Round in an effort to abide by the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT] regula­
tions. The previous import system, direct quotas, 
was said to be in violation of GATT Article XI,
which prohibited quantitative import restrictions. 
The TRQ system is a two-tiered tariff; a certain 
number of imports [called "in-quota" imports) are 
allowed into the United States at a low tariff, and 
any number of imports above that initial amount 
are subject to a much higher "out-of-quota" tariff 
[ERS/USDA 2005). This system is designed, on 
paper, to reduce market barriers and eliminate the 
direct quota placed on many goods.
Other provisions within the TRQ system include a 
minimum market access requirement for imports. 
The United States was required to import at least 3 
percent of its domestic consumption of sugar for 
six years; in 2000 the rule was changed to 5 
percent of domestic consumption. At that point 
the United States already imported more than 5 
percent of its domestic consumption of sugar, 
however, so the decision about whether to increase 
its in-quota volume of sugar imports was voluntary.
Sugar TRQs within the United States are based 
primarily on historical trading patterns. The TRQ 
in-quota number is based on 40 countries' patterns 
[or "Olympic market shares") during 1975-1981. 
This was a period of extremely high world sugar 
prices during which many countries with high 
producer costs were able to remain competitive. 
During these years, exporters with the largest share 
of the U.S. raw cane sugar market included 
Australia, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and the 
Philippines. The relative proportion of sugar 
exports from various countries in 1975-1981 was 
nearly identical to the proportion of TRQ allot­
ments distributed to sugar-producing countries 
today.
The implementation of TRQs for sugar [and other 
tradable commodities) can have three effects. First, 
the in-quota tariff can be the binding constraint, 
causing even fewer imports than those under the 
original quota system. Second, the TRQ can act as 
a two-tiered tariff if there are over-quota imports 
of a specific good. Third, the in-quota tariff can 
have the same net effect as the direct quota, lead­
ing to the import of the same volume of sugar as 
under the original quota system. If the in-quota 
tariff proves to be the binding constraint, many 
scholars worry about the possibility of "underfill," 
which occurs when the exporting country does not 
fill TRQ allotments; the worldwide average TRQ fill 
rate hovers around 60 percent [Canadian Agri- 
Food Trade Alliance 2003).
As a result of NAFTA, substantial TRQ allotments 
are distributed to both Canada and Mexico. Other 
countries are given specific in-quota allotments 
each year, set by the U.S. Department of Agricul­
ture [USDAj. For fiscal year 2004, Australia, Brazil, 
the Dominican Republic, and the Philippines were 
given the largest TRQ allotments for raw cane 
sugar, refined sugar, and sugar-containing 
products. There is also a quantity of sugar under 
the TRQ system that is available for import on a 
first-come, first-served basis. By examining patterns 
associated with sugar trade, it is possible to see 
some of the effects of a TRQ system. It is probable 
that TRQs benefit a handful of countries with large 
in-quota allocations; they may also encourage high- 
cost producers to increase their exports.
Other than TRQs, sugar can enter the United 
States through three other programs, which are 
not subject to quotas or tariffs. The three pro­
grams are the USDA's Sugar-Containing Products 
Re-Export Program, the Refined-Sugar Re-Export 
Program, and the Sugar for the Production of 
Polyhydric Alcohol Program.
High-Fructose Corn Syrup
As the demand for sugar decreases in the United 
States, other sweeteners face increased demand. 
High-fructose corn syrup [HFCS) is a cheap alterna­
tive to sugar and is an ingredient in nearly all soft 
drinks. The production of HFCS in the United 
States has been increasing at a faster rate than the 
production of both beet and cane sugar. In an 
analysis of the TRQ system, it is important to keep 
in mind the U.S. production, demand, and imports 
of HFCS. It is possible that increased use of HFCS 
has resulted in decreased TRQ sugar imports.
The production of HFCS has skyrocketed in the 
United States. Between 1980 and the 2000s, U.S. 
production of HFCS grew from 2.2 million tons to 
9.2 million tons. The biggest growth in production, 
however, came between the years 1975 and 1989, 
around the same time that U.S. sugar imports had 
their most significant decline. Production of beet 
and cane sugar has grown in the United States, but 
this growth has been slower and not as significant. 
Consumption of beet and cane sugar has declined, 
whereas HFCS consumption has increased. The con­
sumption of HFCS increased by more than 1,000 
percent between 1970 and 1990.
HFCS can be produced much more cheaply than 
sugar, so its price is significantly lower than that of 
sugar. In 2000, for example, raw cane sugar in the 
United States was priced at 18.4 cents a pound and 
refined sugar was priced at 24 cents a pound. In 
contrast, HFCS-42 [a commonly used type of 
HFCS] was priced at 11 cents a pound in 2000. 
HFCS is thus a practical replacement for sugar 
when substitution is possible.
Despite the rise in HFCS, sugar remains a large U.S. 
industry and TRQs are still the main way the 
United States imports its sugar. TRQs may not 
determine how much total sugar gets imported, 
but they do determine the specific sugar-exporting 
countries and how much sugar each one of these 
countries can export into the United States.
Preferential Trade Agreements
In addition to historical trading patterns between 
1975 and 1981, a large percentage of U.S. TRQ sugar 
imports are determined by preferential trade 
agreements. The United States and other countries 
have used both regional trade agreements and 
TRQs to "grandfather" a share of the market for a 
specific supplier. As many scholars have already 
documented, however, preferential trade status is 
often awarded to countries that may not be truly 
competitive; in fact, some countries in preferential 
trade agreements might not export a specific good 
at all if not given preferential trade status. Granting 
TRQs to high-cost producing countries is just one 
example of how resources may be misallocated 
within international agreements. On the other 
hand, these trade diversions away from some low- 
cost producers enable other least-developed coun­
tries to gain access to potential markets, if they are 
granted preferential status under a regional agree­
ment.
NAFTA. The North American Free Trade Agree­
ment, established in 1994, has been reducing trade 
barriers between Mexico and the United States, 
especially in regard to sugar trade. For the first 15 
years of NAFTA, "Mexico's allowable duty-free 
sugar exports to the U.S. and U.S. duty-free 
exports to Mexico is the greater of 7,258 metric 
tons or the quantity allowed under the definition 
of 'net surplus producer"'[production greater than 
consumption, including consumption of high-fruc- 
tose corn syrup] [FAS/USDA 2003], According to 
the agreement, "If either Mexico or the U.S. were
in a situation where they were a net surplus 
producer during the first six years of the agree­
ment, duty-free access would be provided from the 
surplus up to 25,000 tons" [FAS/USDA 2003],
Before the implementation of NAFTA, Mexico 
exported 7,258 metric tons of raw sugar to the 
United States. By 2001 Mexico exported 116,000 
metric tons of sugar (mostly refined sugar] to the 
United States. At the end of the sixth year [2000], 
Mexico aligned its tariff regime with that of the 
United States and implemented TRQ rates that 
matched U.S. rates. Beginning in year 7 and up to 
year 15, any tariffs that remain on sugar within this 
bilateral agreement will be reduced on a straight- 
line basis to zero (FAS/USDA 2003],
Like all other TRQ allotments, allotments of sugar­
cane and sugarbeets must be processed in the 
country of origin. In this case processing must 
occur in NAFTA territory to qualify for NAFTA 
preferences, TRQ in-quota tariff rates, or both 
(FAS/USDA 2003], Countries within NAFTA 
(Canada and Mexico] also take part in the Refined 
Sugar Re-export Program. Given that refined sugar 
now constitutes the majority of Mexico's sugar 
exports, NAFTA's effect on raw sugar imports is 
minimal.
The Generalized System o f Preferences
[GSP]/Caribbean Basin initiative [CBIJ Approxi­
mately 42 countries are given TRQ allotments 
under the historical method. These 42 countries 
are geographically dispersed; are small, medium, 
and large in size; have both large and small sugar 
yields; and consist of high-cost, medium-cost, and 
low-cost producers. The Generalized System of 
Preferences/Caribbean Basin Initiative is an initiative 
that grants some of these sugar exporters a waiver 
on in-quota sugar exports to the United States. 
GSP countries are not permanent, and reviews for 
eligibility are done periodically, to be renewed by 
Congress.
Congo-Brazzaville, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Haiti, 
Madagascar, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, St. Kitts 
and Nevis, and Uruguay are currently part of the 
GSP. These designated countries have been given 
quota rights that allow them each to export 7,258 
metric tons of raw cane sugar to the U.S. duty-free. 
Note, however, that Gabon, St. Kitts and Haiti do 
not produce commercial quantities of raw cane
sugar and will likely fall short in fulfilling their 
quota allocations. Additionally, the CAFTA coun­
tries are no longer eligible for GSP status because 
they are allowed duty-free exports to the United 
States under CAFTA. Finally, Argentina, Australia, 
Brazil, the Dominican Republic [now part of 
CAFTA and previously under the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative], and Taiwan are not eligible for GSP 
status.
One program within this Generalized System of 
Preferences is the Caribbean Basin Initiative [CBI], 
an expansion of the Caribbean Basin Economic 
Recovery Act [CBERA Expansion Act] of 1983. 
Since 1983 the act has been expanded through the 
creation of the CBERA Expansion Act and the 
U.S.-Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act of 
2000 [CBTPA]. Thus far, the initiative benefits 24 
countries, all of which export sugar into the United 
States duty-free. This program was originally 
designed to promote economic development in 
Central America and the Caribbean islands through 
private sector initiatives [MAC/USDOC 2000], 
The goal was to expand foreign and domestic 
investment in nontraditional sectors, diversifying 
CBI country economies and expanding their 
exports. For fiscal year 2004, the United States 
granted a total of 381,119 metric tons of in-quota 
allotments to CBI countries, creating the potential 
for 34 percent of U.S. TRQ sugar to be imported 
from these countries.
Altogether, the allotments granted to the GSP 
minimum-quota countries and the CBI countries 
enable these countries to account for the majority 
of TRQ sugar allotments given out for import into 
the United States.
The Policy Challenges
CAFTA
On August 2, 2005, President Bush signed 
CAFTA, the latest preferential trade agreement 
incorporating Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and 
the United States [Olson 2005], One of the most 
contentious issues throughout the CAFTA debate 
was its potential impact on sugar exports from 
Central American countries and on the U.S. sugar 
program.
Tariff- and Quota-Free Import Programs
As previously stated, raw cane sugar can also be 
exported to the United States under tariff- and 
quota-free programs. One program is the USDA's 
Sugar-Containing Products Re-Export Program 
[FAS/USDA 2004], Here, the United States can 
buy sugar at the world price to use in products 
that will later be exported onto the world market. 
The Refined-Sugar Re-Export Program, another way 
the United States can import sugar, can "facilitate 
the use of domestic refining capacity to export 
refined sugar to the world market" [FAS/USDA 
2004]. Last, the Sugar for the Production of Poly- 
hydric Alcohol Program accounts for a small per­
centage of sugar imports. In general, the U.S. 
government allows domestic sugar refiners to 
import raw sugar without tariff-rate quotas as long 
as the refined sugar is [1] re-exported in refined 
form, [2] re-exported in sugar-containing products, 
or [3] used for the production of polyhydric 
alcohol. Through the re-export programs, a 
refinery can apply to the secretary of agriculture 
for a license to import up to 50,000 metric tons 
of raw sugar; the sugar must then be re-exported 
or transferred to a manufacturer [of sugar- 
containing products for export] within 90 days of 
import. These raw cane sugar imports under the re­
export program can be replaced with refined sugar 
from either sugarbeets or sugar cane.
Scholars believe that imports of sugar under the 
tariff- and quota-free programs may be representa­
tive of a free trade sugar model. These programs 
presumably illustrate what happens to exports into 
the United States without import restriction. Two 
general characteristics of the countries exporting 
under the "free trade" model include their low cost 
of production and their proximity to the United 
States. The disparity between those exporting 
under the tariff- and quota-free programs and 
those sugar exporters under the TRQ system is 
clear. This disparity, then, lends itself to a further 
investigation of the differences between the coun­
tries that export to the United States under these 
two distinct trade regimes.
One method of examining the effects of TRQs is 
to compare the established TRQ trade flows with 
the trade flows under tariff- and quota-exempt 
export shares (which occur primarily under the re­
export programs]. Below are the general differences 
between TRQ sugar imports and sugar imports 
under tariff- and quota-free programs (SkuIIy 2001],
Figure I illustrates that when imports into the 
United States are free of tariffs and quotas, 
Colombia, Guatemala, and other Central American 
countries dominate the U.S. sugar market. When 
TRQs are used, however, Colombia and Guatemala
have small shares of overall U.S. sugar imports; 
Central American and Caribbean countries hold 
about one-fourth of the U.S. sugar import market, 
and "all others" account for slightly less than three- 
quarters of U.S. sugar imports.
Figure l: Quota-Exempt U.S. Sugar Imports Compared with U.S. TRQ Sugar Imports
Distribution of trade for U.S. sugar imports
Quota-exempt shares
TRQ shares
□ Guatemala 1 1 Other Central
American and Caribbean
Colombia countries
n All others
Source: Skully 2001.
Stakeholders
U.S. Stakeholders
Opponents of CAFTA believe that its passage may 
lead to increased bilateral and regional trade 
agreements, causing increased duty-free sugar 
imports into the United States and the eventual 
destruction of the U.S. sugar industry. The Sugar 
Alliance, a coalition of sugarcane and sugar beet 
farmers, processors, and others involved in the 
sugar industry, was perhaps the most vocal U.S. 
opponent to the passage of CAFTA. They believe 
that, in order to eliminate the sugar dumping that 
occurs in the world market, “the drastic reform 
necessary to correct the world sugar market can 
only be achieved in comprehensive, global negotia­
tions in the World Trade Organization and not in 
bilateral or regional Free Trade Agreements, such 
as CAFTA" [Suppan 2004). Other opponents 
include primarily farm-based agricultural groups 
[excluding the American Farm Bureau) [Suppan 
2004).
Other U.S. commodity organizations support 
CAFTA. President Bush received a letter from 39 
commodity and agribusiness organizations noting 
their support for CAFTA and stating that this 
trade agreement "will expand U.S. agriculture 
exports and put U.S. agriculture on an equal foot­
ing with its competitors in these markets" (Jurenas 
2004). Among the most surprising signatories was 
the National Corn Growers Association, a member 
of the Sugar Alliance [Suppan 2004).
Currently, the U.S. sugar system's primary benefi­
ciaries, according to the Government Accounta­
bility Office, are domestic sugar farmers and 
processors [Markheim 2005). In 1996 these groups 
pulled in about US$800 million in benefits, and in 
1998, about US$1 billion.
Consumers in the United States will not see much 
change in the price of sugar from the implementa­
tion of CAFTA. Because sugar imports under 
CAFTA are still relatively small, the U.S. trade pro­
tection system implemented on sugar imports
keeps consumer prices relatively high. Yet as more 
and more sugar is imported into the U.S. duty-free 
within other trade agreements [such as the U.S.- 
Mexico agreement), sugar prices to consumers will 
decrease. If U.S. consumer prices drop as a result 
of duty-free imports, the United States could main­
tain its sugar program by increasing subsidies to 
producers.
Stakeholders outside the United States
Approximately 40  countries export sugar to the 
United States under the TRQ system. Many of 
these countries depend on guaranteed duty-free 
sugar exports. Of these countries, some are high- 
cost producers, some are low-cost producers, some 
are geographically far from the United States, and 
some are within close proximity. Some countries 
have a high production volume of sugar while 
others produce only a small amount each season. 
Changes in the TRQ system will affect the flow of 
sugar exports from these countries. These coun­
tries thus have a stake in how TRQs are allocated, 
as well as in how trade agreements such as CAFTA 
will affect their region.
Several factors determine a country's competitive­
ness on the world market; selected variables are 
included in Tables 1 through 3. Table 1 lists the low- 
cost and high-cost producers involved in raw cane 
sugar production.
Of all the cane sugar producers, Australia and 
Brazil have the lowest production costs. They are, 
however, the only countries that still face an in­
quota tariff at 0.625 cents a pound. Given that 
they are the lowest-cost producers and the only 
countries to face an in-quota duty, they may argue 
that they should become part of a trade agreement 
that allows them duty-free access into the United 
States.
Table I: Lowest- and Highest-Cost Producers o f Raw Cane Sugar (excluding transportation costs), FY  
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Australia 1 87,402 62,873 0 36,012,000 10,627 0.625
Brazil 1 152,691 143,845 0 386,232,000 4,784 0.625
Colombia 2 25,273 25,273 81,321 36,600,000 2,480 0
Guatemala9 2 50,546 50,546 172,285 17,500,000 2,056 0
Sudan 2 0 0 0 5,500,000 6,359 0
Malawi 3 10,530 10,530 0 1,900,000 7,769 0
Mozambique 3 13,690 13,690 0 400,000 8,193 0
Swaziland 3 16,849 16,849 0 4,000,000 8,133 0
Thailand 3 14,743 14,743 0 64,407,744 9,038 0
Zimbabwe 3 12,636 596 0 4,100,000 7,788 0
Zambia 3 0 0 0 1,800,000 7,546 0
Ecuador 4 11,583 11,583 0 5,690,895 2,822 0
El Salvador9 4 27,379 27,379 36,900 4,531,531 2,072 0
Peru II 43,175 42,882 0 9,550,000 3,365 0
Paraguay II 7,258 1,649 0 3,300,000 4,655 0
Papua New 
Guinea
II 7,258 7,258 0 441/600 9,310 0
Panama 11 30,538 30,538 0 1,500,000 2,201 0
Cote d'Ivoire 11 7,258 0 0 1,155,000 4,799 0
Mexico 12 7,258 1,274 0 42,126,500 2,086 0
Jamaica 12 11,583 11,501 0 2,400,000 1,545 0
Barbados 13 7,371 0 0 364,555 2,093 0
Taiwan 14 12,636 41 0 163,000 7,801 0
Saudi Arabia 14 0 0 0 0 6,382 0
Source: Data are from Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Note: All production cost ranks were conducted using FY 2003/2004 exchange rates. This rank may change as exchange 
rates change over time.
9 El Salvador and Guatemala are part of the recently passed Central American Free Trade Agreement.
It is important to compare TRQ allotments with 
actual TRQ imports to determine whether or not 
the MFN rate [out-of-quota tariff] is prohibitive 
and is preventing exporting countries from 
increasing the volume of raw cane sugar exports to 
the United States. It may be the case that low-cost 
producers with high MFN rates are losing U.S. 
sugar market share to other high-cost producers 
with lower tariff rates [or no tariffs]. Again, this is 
one way in which trade flows can become distorted; 
the United States may be favoring imports from 
countries that are not actually the lowest-cost 
producers.
Another important factor is the distance of these 
countries from the United States. Given that 
Australia is one of the farthest countries from the 
United States, it may face high transportation costs.
Aside from Australia and Brazil, many developing 
countries are low-cost producers. Colombia, 
Guatemala, and Sudan also have very low produc­
tion costs. Colombia currently has duty-free access 
to the United States and is filling its TRQ allot­
ment. Colombia also has a substantial volume of 
sugar exports under other U.S. sugar import pro­
grams and is relatively close to the United States. 
Given that it has such a large volume of sugar 
exports under the other sugar import programs, 
Colombia may benefit from increased TRQ allot­
ments.
Guatemala is also a low-cost producer. As part of 
CAFTA, Guatemala is guaranteed increased raw 
cane sugar exports to the United States. Of all the 
CAFTA countries, Guatemala has been allotted the 
largest increase in in-quota sugar exports.
Brazil produces by far the greatest amount of raw 
cane sugar. It is a low-cost producer and is rela­
tively dose to the United States. The country is 
given the largest U.S. TRQ allotment and comes 
dose to filling it. In contrast, Saudi Arabia and 
Taiwan are among the highest-cost producers of 
raw cane sugar. Many of the high-cost producers 
have been given substantial TRQ allotments by the 
United States. Despite their duty-free TRQ allot­
ments, 4 out of 14 of these countries did not 
export any raw cane sugar to the United States in
2003/2004. Other countries, such as Mexico and 
Paraguay, did not come close to filling their given 
TRQ allotments.
Many of these high-cost producers would likely be 
affected by the removal of TRQs. High-cost 
producers that fill their quotas will be most 
affected. Without the given TRQ allotments, these 
high-cost producers may not be as competitive. If 
the market becomes inundated with low-cost raw 
cane sugar from large producers, higher-priced 
goods will lose market share. High-cost producers 
located farther from the United States, and where 
sugar production constitutes a significant portion 
of agricultural trade, will be most affected.
If sugar trade were liberalized, Panama and Peru 
could lose a significant share of their relatively 
large volume of sugar exports, yet the economic 
impact within these countries is debatable. Both 
Panama and Peru export less than 2 percent of 
their countries' sugar production; getting closed 
out of the U.S. sugar market, then, may not result 
in any significant negative economic impact.
Table 2 lists the largest producers of raw cane 
sugar. As one can easily see, a large production 
volume does not necessarily mean the country is 
also a low-cost producer. India, for example, is the 
world's second-largest producer of raw cane sugar 
yet has high production costs. Mexico is also a 
fairly large producer of raw cane sugar with one of 
the highest production costs. Thanks to NAFTA, 
Mexico has duty-free access to the United States 
sugar market.
CAFTA Si d beholders
Of the CAFTA countries, Guatemala is the lowest- 
cost producer, followed by El Salvador (Table 3], 
Costa Rica, Honduras, and Nicaragua have the next 
lowest production cost; the Dominican Republic has 
the highest production cost. (Honduras's produc­
tion and TRQ allotments are not representative in 
this year; for an accurate picture of Honduras's 
sugar production, examine the data from previous 
years.] Guatemala has the largest production 
volume; all other CAFTA countries produce sub­
stantially less raw cane sugar.
Table 2: Largest Producers (by volume) o f Raw Cane Sugar, F Y  2003/2004
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Brazil 386,232,000 1 152/591 143,845 0 4,784 0.625
India 289,630,016 9 8,424 8,418 0 7,808 0
Thailand 64,407,744 3 14,743 14,743 0 9,038 0
Mexico 45,126,500 12 7,258 1,274 0 2,086 0
Colombia 36 ,600,000 2 25,273 25,283 81,321 2,480 0
Australia 36,012,000 1 87,402 6 im 0 10/527 0.625
Source: Data are from Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture.
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Costa Rica 6 3,923,870 15,796 15,796 81,321 2,240 0
Dominican
Republic
7 5,036,272 185,335 134,471 0 1,552 0
El Salvador 4 4,531,531 27,379 27,379 36,900 2,072 0
Guatemala 2 17,500,000 50,546 50,546 172,285 2,056 0
Honduras 6 4 ,200 ,0 00 10,530 458* 3,440 2,000 0
Nicaragua 6 3/502,840 22,114 19,425 11,878 2,101 0
Source: Data are from Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Additional Potential Impacts of CAFTA
Market Access for CAFTA Countries
With the implementation of CAFTA, the office of 
the U.S. trade representative [USTR] has stated that 
increased sugar imports from Central America and 
the Dominican Republic would amount to less than 
0.25 percent of total annual U.S. trade with these 
countries [USTR 2005], Even though the change in 
the overall percentage of trade with these countries 
is small, U.S. sugar market access will increase for 
CAFTA countries. In the first year of the agree­
ment, the USTR estimated that increased market 
access will amount to about 1.2 percent of current 
U.S. sugar consumption, up to 107,000 metric 
tons of raw cane sugar; in year 15, it is estimated 
that increased market access will amount to 1.7 
percent of U.S. sugar consumption, up to about 
151,000 metric tons of raw cane sugar [USTR 
2005]. Over the next several years these countries 
will be allotted increased TRQs but no reduction in 
over-quota tariff rates. For the Dominican Republic, 
TRQs will increase 10,000 metric tons in the first 
year, and 2 percent annually every year after that 
[Olson 2005]. In addition to TRQs, the United 
States will create a quota for Costa Rican special 
goods [organic sugar], not to  exceed 2 ,000  metric 
tons annually [Olson 2005],
Although the in-quota exports to the United States 
are duty-free, the second-tier tariff will initially 
remain in effect. After five years of CAFTA's 
implementation, the second-tier tariff will be 10 
cents a pound. After 10 years, it will be 5 cents, 
and after 15 years, zero. Beginning in 2008 , Mexico 
will also have unlimited sugar export rights to the 
United States.
CAFTA's increase in market access has the poten­
tial to affect not only the volume of exports 
allowed from CAFTA countries to  the United 
States, but also many other aspects of the U.S. 
sugar program.
CAFTA's Impact on the Price of Raw Cane 
Sugar
As more sugar is imported into the United States, 
the wholesale price of sugar decreases. As the price 
decreases, domestic consumption increases. One 
would expect the price decline to lead to a decrease 
in sugar acreage in the United States. In the past,
however, beet and cane sugar production have 
been insensitive to price changes [elasticity is 0.22 
for sugar beets, 0.11 for sugar cane, and -0.39 for 
domestic consumption]. If the sugar price were to 
drop below 20 cents a pound, it is predicted that 
the elasticity of the U.S. sugar supply would 
increase [Koo et al. 2003],
The world market price for sugar is about 8 cents a 
pound, slightly more than half the world average 
cost of production. The U.S.-supported domestic 
price of sugar is about 21 cents a pound. Countries 
that export to the United States receive the U.S. 
supported price for their sugar. There is only one 
country, Brazil, that has a domestic wholesale price 
lower than the world price.
Wholesale refined sugar prices to the U.S. farmer 
dropped by 20.5 percent during 1996-2004, 
whereas consumer prices increased by nearly 3 
percent [Olson 2005]. This gap illustrates the dis­
parity between price changes for farmers and 
consumers.
CAFTA's Impact on Marketing Allotments
CAFTA may also affect marketing allotments for 
U.S. sugar processors. The secretary of agriculture 
"will strive to  establish an overall allotment quantity 
that results in no forfeitures of sugar to the 
Commodity Credit Corporation under the sugar 
loan program" [USDA 2003, 2], The planting of 
beets and sugar cane is not restricted, but if 
processors exceed their marketing allotment, they 
must store the excess sugar at their expense. In the 
1996 Farm Bill, Congress removed marketing allot­
ments but later reestablished them in the 2002  
Farm Bill, hoping to increase the price of U.S. 
sugar.
These marketing allotments are based in part upon 
the volume of imported sugar used for food 
[USDA 2003]. Thus, as CAFTA increases U.S. 
sugar market access for many sugar-producing 
countries, the U.S. sugar program may potentially 
face an increase in sugar from CAFTA countries 
that results in a level of imports above the so-called 
trigger level.
The 2002 Farm Bill set the trigger level at 1.39 
million metric tons of total sugar imports. If 
imports are below this amount, then marketing 
allotments for the U.S. sugar program are unaf­
fected. But some fear that increased CAFTA 
imports, together with sugar imports under 
NAFTA, could surpass the trigger level. If this 
occurs, the USDA would no longer have the 
authority to distribute marketing allotments. Sugar 
producers would be able to produce and sell un­
limited amounts of sugar. Production would likely 
increase, and U.S. sugar prices would fall.
If all countries use their new quotas under CAFTA, 
then the buffer below the trigger level would 
remain at 98 ,000 metric tons [Figure 2]. If, how­
ever, new trade agreements are established or if 
Mexico uses its full sugar export quota, then total 
sugar imports into the United States would surpass 
the trigger level. According to Olson [2005, 12], 
"If imports exceed the trigger level and marketing 
allocations were suspended, then increased domes­
tic production would combine with the release of
currently blocked sugar reserves to flood the 
market and collapse the domestic price of sugar."
CAFTA's Impact on U.S. Sugar Industry 
fobs
If CAFTA leads to increased production of sugar 
outside the United States and decreased sugar 
production within the United States, many argue 
that the loss of jobs from the decline of this indus­
try will be insignificant. Although production of 
sugar in the United States has been increasing, 
employment in this sector has declined since 1989. 
In 2003 only 52 ,000 workers were employed in 
the sugar industry [farmers and processors], 
generating approximately US$5.7 billion in sales. Of 
the more than 2 million farms in the United States, 
fewer than 6 ,0 0 0  [0.03 percent] contained sugar 
beets or cane. If sugar continues to benefit from 
government protection, Markheim [2005] argues 
instead that jobs in the sweetener industry [which 
employs 10 times as many people as the sugar 
industry] will be threatened.
Figure 2: N o-Cost Sugar Policy Jeopardized by CAFTA
U.S. sugar imports
Buffer (excl. Mexico's NAFTA quota)
15-year increased DR-CAFTATRQ
Source: Olson 2005.
Questions and Issues to Consider
• If TRQ allocations are eliminated, will poor 
countries be able to retain their access to 
the U.S. market?
• What will happen to high-cost producers if 
some low-cost producers are allowed duty­
free access under CAFTA or other 
regional trade agreements?
• If TRQs were eliminated, would developing 
countries be forced to compete with the 
lowest-cost producers who now have a 
greater share of the market?
• Are preferential trade agreements just a 
stepping stone toward greater liberaliza­
tion?
• What happens when powers are unequal? 
For example, what if CAFTA countries are 
more dependent on the United States than 
the United States is on CAFTA? What 
might this imbalance mean for labor and 
environmental standards?
• Why would the National Corn Growers 
Association choose to support CAFTA?
• If the U.S. price of sugar falls to about the 
world market price, will countries lose a 
large share of the U.S. domestic market? 
Some countries, like Australia, Brazil, 
South Africa, and Thailand, may be able to 
produce more and export more to make 
up for the price difference, but what will 
other countries do?
• If the U.S. market is deregulated and some 
developing and low-income countries no 
longer have the share of the U.S. market 
they depend on, what are some alterna­
tives?
• What should TRQs be based on? Should 
they seek to maximize development oppor­
tunities in poor countries? If so, what 
criteria should selection be based on [for 
example, a country's per capita incomeP
• How will other future trade agreements 
potentially affect low-income sugar-ex- 
porting countries?
• All WTO countries are able to use a 
safeguard clause within a trade agreement. 
The USTR [2005] explains this option as 
follows: "The [CAFTA] Agreement also 
includes a mechanism that allows the 
United States, at its option, to provide 
some form of alternative compensation to 
CAFTA country exporters in place of 
sugar imports. That allows the United 
States to restrict imports eligible to enter 
under the CAFTA if the U.S. sugar pro­
gram is threatened, and instead provide 
equivalent benefits to the CAFTA coun­
tries to make up for the lost access." The 
safeguard clause was developed to protect 
a country's market system, but because it 
requires compensation, it is seldom used in 
practice. Instead, subsidies and distorted 
trade agreements are often the norm to 
sustain a country's market system. What 
may be a more effective alternative to 
these current practices?
• Are tariff rates so high that they are pro­
hibiting trade? In the case of TRQs that 
were meant to do away with direct quotas, 
the out-of-quota tariff rate is so high that 
for a sugar-exporting country, it is not 
worth sending sugar to the United States 
above its in-quota allotment.
•  Are regional trade agreements just an easy 
way out for countries that do not want 
full liberalization of their market? Does the 
agreement mention further liberalization in 
the future? What countries are included in 
the trade agreement? It is possible that 
countries excluded from the agreement 
will also be hindered from future trade 
with countries within the free trade 
agreement. In other words, do free trade 
agreements divert trade away from non­
member countries?
•  The rule of origin clause specifies the share 
of the total value of a commodity [such as 
raw materials] that must originate in either 
the exporting country or the importing 
country. This requirement can sometimes 
increase costs for developing countries, as
they may be forced to buy raw materials 
from the United States at increased prices 
[rather than a nearby country that may 
produce materials at a much lower cost]. 
Many times there are "cumbersome meas­
ures to verify that textiles/apparel are 
made locally and additional safeguard 
measures that limit the possible market 
access gains" [Third World Network 2005, 
4].
•  How many years will it take to reduce 
trade barriers and to reach the termination 
point of reduction at which market access 
remains constant? Is it the same for each 
country?
•  Are proposed export and import levels 
under the new trade agreement signifi­
cantly different from prior levels? Who is 
gaining access, and who is losing access to 
export markets? Why are some countries 
gaining a greater share of the market than 
others? Most important, what are export 
and import values based on? With sugar 
imports into the United States, for exam­
ple, TRQ allotments are based on historical 
trading patterns during 1975-1981. This was 
a time of extremely high sugar prices; thus 
many countries included in sugar trade 
agreements with the United States are 
actually high-cost producers.
• Many free trade agreements state that the 
developing country must provide 
reciprocal market access to the partner 
country in the agreement. If reciprocal 
market access were required, what may be 
the impact on developing countries?
•  In some trade agreements, "sensitive 
products" are excluded or contain differ­
ent provisions from the rest of the trade 
agreement. For example, the Everything 
But Arms agreement between the 
European Union and least-developed coun­
tries provides duty-free access to EU 
markets, with the exception of bananas, 
sugar, and rice, which are undergoing 
alternative [and slower] phase-in periods. 
These products are considered sensitive 
because increased imports of these 
products have the greatest ability to dis­
rupt domestic markets.
•  How are labor and environmental stand­
ards clauses written? Some speculate that 
these trade agreement standards can 
actually become just another trade barrier, 
restricting the export of a good from a 
developing country. Although labor and 
environmental standards are extremely 
important, caution must be taken to make 
sure they are not being used as simply 
another impediment to  trade.
Assignment
Your assignment is to develop a set of polices 
under CAFTA that will satisfy all stakeholders. Dis­
cuss the policy issues with regard to alternative 
import mechanisms under CAFTA and which 
stakeholders might support or resist these policies. 
Justify your recommendations, and assess the con­
sequences for the stakeholder groups.
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